Q-Shield · post-quantum readiness
A post-quantum readiness scanner for your servers, with a signed report your auditor can check.
Q-Shield finds your quantum-vulnerable encryption, ranks what to fix first, moves your most sensitive files onto post-quantum encryption now, and hands your auditor signed proof. The threat is harvest now, decrypt later: traffic recorded today can be read once a large quantum computer exists.
Three free design-partner slots. Sign-in is invite-only during the program.
What it is · who it's for
It checks a company's TLS, SSH, mail and database servers against NIST IR 8547 or the NSA's CNSA 2.0, ranks what to fix first, and produces a report signed with Ed25519 and ML-DSA-87 that an auditor can verify offline with OpenSSL.
The questions mid-market companies are asked: NIST's 2030 and 2035 dates, PCI DSS 4.0 requirement 12.3.3, cyber-insurance questionnaires.
New national-security purchases need CNSA 2.0 from Jan 1, 2027, and EO 14412 has federal contractors meet NIST's post-quantum standards by Dec 31, 2030. The signed collector runs the same scan inside networks that won't let outside traffic in.
Two signatures, Ed25519 and ML-DSA-87, checked offline with OpenSSL against the keys EpochCore publishes, and a CBOM (CycloneDX 1.6) beside the PDF and the signed JSON.
Two scan profiles
Every scan is checked against Mid-market or CNSA 2.0, and Findings switches the same results between them. The same server can be fixed under one and open under the other.
| Mid-marketNIST IR 8547 | CNSA 2.0NSA · national-security systems | |
|---|---|---|
| The rules | NIST IR 8547 (final, October 2026): RSA and ECC deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035. | The NSA's suite for national-security systems: ML-KEM-1024 key establishment and ML-DSA-87 signatures. |
| Made for | The questions mid-market companies are asked: NIST's dates, the PCI DSS 4.0 crypto inventory, cyber-insurance questionnaires. | Defense suppliers and anyone selling into national-security work. |
| When | 2030 and 2035. | New national-security purchases need it from Jan 1, 2027. |
| Key exchange | ||
| What passes | Any post-quantum key exchange, hybrid or not. | ML-KEM-1024, alone or with its P-384 hybrid. |
| The extra hello | Each TLS host is asked whether it accepts the post-quantum hybrid X25519MLKEM768 offered alone. | Each TLS host is also sent a CNSA-2.0-only hello: ML-KEM-1024 and its P-384 hybrid. |
| X25519MLKEM768 | Passes It protects against harvest now, decrypt later. | Fails Unless the server also takes ML-KEM-1024 offered alone. |
| Certificates and the rest | ||
| Certificates | RSA and ECC certificates are due by the end of 2035. | ML-DSA-87 certificates. |
| The rest of the suite | — | CNSA 2.0 also requires AES-256, SHA-384/512, and LMS/XMSS for code signing. The scan reads what a server shows from outside; the Plan notes any cipher below AES-256. |
Q-Shield · Findings, same scan under each profileExample data
Scan of Nov 3, 2026 · 9 hosts
| Host | Check | Server would pick | Traffic exposed | Mid-market | CNSA 2.0 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| www.alder.example:443 | Key exchange | X25519MLKEM768 | No | meets the rule | fails |
| mail.alder.example:587 | Key exchange | X25519 | Yes | fails | fails |
| vpn.alder.example:443 | Key exchange | X25519 | Yes | fails | fails |
| db.alder.example:5432 | Key exchange | secp256r1 | Yes | fails | fails |
www.alder.example: The server says: Cloudflare (from its Server header, "cloudflare"). It accepts X25519MLKEM768 offered alone and none of the CNSA 2.0 key exchanges.
What the scan finds
The scan reads what each server offers before any data moves, and records what it saw beside every verdict.
Three hellos per TLS host: one like a browser's, one post-quantum only, one CNSA 2.0 only. You see what a browser actually gets and what the server could offer.
The key exchange an up-to-date OpenSSH client would use, read before any key is exchanged.
The key and signature algorithm (RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA). A quantum-breakable certificate lets someone impersonate the server later. TLS 1.2 RSA key transport counts as a key-exchange problem.
A certificate from an issuer browsers stopped trusting fails every profile, goes to the top of the plan, and is due the day of the scan.
On HTTPS, the version in the Server and X-Powered-By headers is checked against CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list (Apache, OpenSSL, PHP, IIS). A match fails both profiles.
SMTP (25, 587), IMAP (143), POP3 (110) and PostgreSQL (5432), each after asking the server to switch to TLS.
The product, page by page
Every screen below is Q-Shield's own page, shown with example data for a made-up company, Alder Biosciences.
Your hosts, your data, your rules
Then every check, host by host
Ranked, dated, and owned
"quantum_timeline": { "algorithm": "ECC-255", "logical_qubits": 2321, "toffoli": 1.27e11, "source": "Roetteler, Naehrig, Svore & Lauter 2017", "roadmap": "IBM Quantum roadmap (June 2025)", "beyond": "beyond its largest milestone (Blue Jay, 2033)", "secret_until": 2036 }


Signed once, checked by anyone
Email, and Slack if you want it
Slack · the weekly check's messageExample data
Encrypted in your browser
The GitHub app
For networks that won't let outside traffic in
Q-Shield · DownloadExample data
Download
No passwords
Safe to run · check it yourself
# the key ids: compare with epochcoreqcs.com/qshield-keys/ $ tail -c 32 ed25519.pub.der | openssl dgst -sha256 -r \ | cut -c 1-16 | tr a-f A-F $ tail -c 2592 ml-dsa-87.pub.der | openssl dgst -sha256 -r \ | cut -c 1-16 | tr a-f A-F # both signatures, offline $ openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -keyform DER \ -inkey ed25519.pub.der -rawin -in message.bin \ -sigfile ed25519.sig Signature Verified Successfully $ openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -keyform DER \ -inkey ml-dsa-87.pub.der -rawin -in message.bin \ -sigfile ml-dsa-87.sig Signature Verified Successfully
The code that checks a report is open source: github.com/EpochCore-LLC/qshield-verify.
A report is valid only if both signatures verify against the keys at epochcoreqcs.com/qshield-keys/. A key carried inside a report is never trusted.
Post-quantum results can be cross-checked against an independent TLS stack (Node with OpenSSL 3.5, tools/crosscheck_node.mjs). CI runs the probe against real CNSA-only, IMAP, POP3, PostgreSQL and LDAP test servers.
We keep your scan results while you're a design partner and for 12 months after. Ask in writing and we delete them within 30 days.
Encrypted in your browser before they leave, with a key locked to your key file. EpochCore can't open them.
No SOC 2 report and no outside code review yet. The verifier is open source, and every report checks without us. Security contact: security.txt.
Where IBM quantum hardware is used
Q-Shield draws random bytes from IBM's Heron quantum processor (QRNG) and mixes them in at three places, each naming the IBM job. When the pool can't supply bytes, the record says the computer's own randomness was used instead. Scanning and ranking run on ordinary computers.
The ML-DSA-87 signature mixes in Heron bytes, and the report names the IBM job.
Heron bytes are mixed with your browser's own, for up to 20 uploads per company per day. The Storage page and the signed report name the job: File key: this browser's random bytes with IBM Heron randomness mixed in (job db4ouu4lf4us73c31ua0)
It rotates every 24 hours, with a 1-hour grace window. Each new seed mixes in Heron bytes, the rotation record names the job, and the seed is wrapped by IBM Key Protect, in hardware security modules IBM documents as FIPS 140-2 Level 3 validated.
Ways to run it
qshield probe, scan, audit and triage: the collector image runs them. Run yourself, triage can ask an AI model you host to re-order the top ten and explain each; it can't add findings or set deadlines. The hosted plan uses no model.# the same commands the collector image runs $ qshield probe www.alder.example $ qshield scan smtp://mail.alder.example:587 \ vpn.alder.example ssh://git.alder.example \ > findings.json $ qshield audit findings.json --profile cnsa2 $ qshield triage findings.json --estate estate.json
Why now
Card-handling companies must document and review the encryption they use at least once a year. It became mandatory with the other future-dated requirements.
PCI Security Standards Council →Federal contractors are to meet NIST's post-quantum standards by Dec 31, 2030.
Federal Register (PDF) →RSA and elliptic-curve encryption, which almost everyone uses today, is deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035.
NIST →New purchases for US national-security systems must use the NSA's post-quantum suite.
NSA (PDF) →Questions
Recording encrypted traffic today, to read it once a large quantum computer exists. Traffic protected by a classical key exchange (RSA or elliptic curves) is exposed; traffic protected by a post-quantum or hybrid key exchange is not.
The hosted scan runs from EpochCore's scan server, so it reaches what the internet can reach. For mail, remote access and databases that only answer inside your network, run the signed collector (qshield.tar, a Docker image) yourself and upload its results. You get the same signed report, and it says the results were collected by you.
It does what a browser does on a first visit: a few TLS hellos, one handshake to read the certificate, and one request for the front page's headers. One host and port at a time, one connection at a time, and each attempt gives up after 5 seconds. It never logs in, and it scans only hosts your company has approved in writing.
NIST IR 8547 (the Mid-market profile) sets the dates for everyone: RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and any post-quantum key exchange passes. CNSA 2.0 is the NSA's stricter suite for national-security systems: ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87, required for new national-security purchases from Jan 1, 2027. The same scan is checked against both.
Usually Mid-market, yes, and CNSA 2.0, no: Cloudflare's edge offers X25519MLKEM768 but not ML-KEM-1024. The bigger exposure is usually elsewhere: mail, VPN, remote access and databases.
No. The report is evidence for an auditor, not a certification, and it covers only the hosts it lists.
Not on the hosted plan: the order comes from Q-Shield's own scoring formula, and no AI model is used. If you run the command line yourself, triage can ask an AI model you host to re-order the top ten and explain each; it can't add findings or set deadlines.
Every signed PDF ends with the OpenSSL commands and the files the check needs: OpenSSL 3.0 or newer checks the Ed25519 signature, 3.5 or newer the ML-DSA-87 signature. The verifier is open source, and the keys are published at epochcoreqcs.com/qshield-keys/ and in the verifier's repository on GitHub. A key carried inside a report is never trusted.
Design partners pay nothing, in exchange for a reference. After the program, a one-time report for up to 25 hosts is $2,500, and the weekly re-check is $300 to $500 a month.
Words on this page
Design partners
Free, in exchange for a reference. A design partner gets the scan, the dated plan, the signed report, and the weekly re-check if they want it; Storage, the GitHub app and the in-network collector come with the same account. Sign-in is invite-only during the program.
After the program: $2,500 for a one-time report of up to 25 hosts, and $300 to $500 a month for the weekly re-check.
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